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After the Supreme Court upheld a prison term of twenty-
five years to life for the crime of shoplifting by a repeat
offender in Ewing v. California,' at least outside the capital
punishment context, there appear to be no longer any
meaningful constitutional limitations on disproportionate
sentences.2 We might even say that the idea of unconstitu-
tionally excessive noncapital punishment died three times
in the past twenty-five years or so, in Rummel v. Estelle in
I98O,3 in Harmelin v. Michigan in I993,4 and finally in
Ewing in 2003. Expressing outrage at decisions like Ewing
begins thus to seem like a ritual we go through roughly
once every decade. At the same time, the idea of aggres-
sive judicial regulation of punishments on proportionality
grounds makes many of us uneasy. The concept of propor-
tionality between crime and punishment seems too vague
and indeterminate, "an invitation to imposition of subjec-
tive views" of federal judges, as justice Scalia warned.5
Without doubt, the question of how much punishment
is too much does not yield a precise answer.6 How many
years in prison is the right amount of punishment for
stealing a car? Two years? Ten years? And how much is
too much? Two years? Seven years? Ten years? Stated this
way, judicial regulation of punishment on proportionality
grounds seems to be a nonstarter, facing overwhelming
difficulties in implementation. The question simply seems
impossible to answer, not because the very concept of
"excessive punishment" is incoherent but because the
concept does not come with precise boundaries.
This concern, while valid, is frequently exaggerated. 7
To be sure, if the task is imagined to be that of each judge
taking a case-by-case, ad hoc approach to determine
whether a particular punishment "mismatches" the crime
of which an offender has been convicted, then the con-
cerns may be warranted. However, there are other ways to
imagine the task of judicial regulation of excessive punish-
ments. The first step is to recognize that the concept of
proportionality can be thought of in terms of comparative
proportionality as well as absolute proportionality. 8 Once
this is recognized, the judiciary can utilize various familiar
doctrinal techniques to bring some determinacy to the
task of placing proportionality limitations on punish-
ments.
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I. Line Drawing
In capital cases, the Supreme Court has categorically ruled
certain crimes and groups of criminals outside the
purview of the death penalty. The inquiry that drives these
cases is whether the criminal defendant is less culpable
than, or as culpable as, a paradigmatic first-degree mur-
derer.9 A sentence of death is disproportionate for the
crime of rape, for instance, not because rape is not a seri-
ous crime, but because it is not as reprehensible as "taking
[a] human life."'0 "Robbery is a serious crime deserving of
serious punishment," but imposing a penalty of death
would be inappropriate because it does not "compare with
murder."" It is unconstitutional to impose the death
penalty on the mentally retarded because they as a group
have "diminish[ed] ... culpability," given their mental
deficiencies.2 The juvenile death penalty is unconstitu-
tional because "[juveniles'] irresponsible conduct is not as
morally reprehensible as that of an adult," and they "can-
not with reliability be classified among the worst
offenders."'3
The same line of reasoning can be applied in noncapi-
tal cases. One can list punishments in order of harshness
and devise a tolerably uncontroversial list of crimes in
order of seriousness.' 4 Then, just as the Court has pro-
ceeded on the assumption that the death penalty is the
harshest punishment, the Court can start from the propo-
sition that life imprisonment is the second harshest form
of punishment. Given the seriousness of life imprison-
ment as punishment, the Court can announce rules that
effectively reserved it only for serious crimes. For
instance, generally violent crimes are considered more
serious than nonviolent crimes. Why not have a general
rule prohibiting governments from imposing life impris-
onment as punishment for drug possession or for
shoplifting or for passing a bad check?
Of course, it may not always be easy to draw sharp
lines. Some arbitrary-and controversial-decisions
will have to be made. Also, as our views of the serious-
ness of certain crimes may change over time, the level
of their punishment may need to be revisited. But this
is only a reason for the Court to keep its interventions
well-targeted, focused, and infrequent and to refrain
from creating anything like a detailed set of sentencing
guidelines; it is not a reason to shy away from the
approach altogether.
II. Policing Overbreadth
The Supreme Court often declares a governmental prac-
tice unconstitutional for one reason or another without
specifying what should replace it. For instance, in Furman
v. Georgia, the Court held that the capital sentencing
regimes being reviewed were unconstitutional.15 Furman
immediately brought about uncertainty about the status of
the death penalty, similar to the way in which Apprendi v.
New Jersey6 and Blakely v. Washington 7 recently threw the
status of various sentencing guideline systems in doubt.
The law eventually settled when in subsequent cases the
Court developed procedural parameters for the imposition
of the death penalty. 8
Similarly, one could imagine a judicial review in which
the Court would ask, "Does the sentencing scheme that
has generated the sentence in question sufficiently distin-
guish among offenders of different levels of seriousness?"
Again, this is a technique that the Court has employed in
the past. In United States v. Bajakajian, the Court held
unconstitutionally excessive a forfeiture in the amount of
$357,144 for a violation of the law requiring persons to file
a report when they transport money in excess of $io,ooo
outside the United States.' 9 In striking down the forfei-
ture, the Court noted that the statute under which
Bajakajian was sentenced merely stated that "[t]he court,
in imposing a sentence on a person convicted of an
offense in violation (of the reporting statute] ... shall
order that the person forfeit to the United States any prop-
erty... involved in such offense, or any property traceable
to such property."20 Dismissing the government's claim
that "[florfeiture of the undeclared cash is perfectly cali-
brated to the seriousness of the defendant's conduct," the
Court responded that "[t]here is no inherent proportional-
ity in such a forfeiture" and that "the harm respondent
caused is [not] anywhere near 30 times greater than that
caused by a hypothetical drug dealer who willfully fails to
report taking $12,000 out of the country in order to pur-
chase drugs. "i2 In other words, the Court suggested that
the sentencing scheme was overbroad and failed to suffi-
ciently distinguish among offenses of varying seriousness.
In the imprisonment context, the Court can apply simi-
lar analyses to declare a sentencing scheme that has
generated a particular punishment to be overbroad and,
like in Furman, invite the legislature to give it another try.
It may be difficult for courts to decide whether a particular
punishment is excessive for a particular crime when the
inquiry is conducted in a vacuum, but evaluating whether
a statutory scheme shows an appropriate amount of "nar-
row tailoring" and sensitivity to differing levels of crime
seriousness is a task that the judiciary can manage. This
kind of dialogical back-and-forth between the courts and
the legislature is a familiar doctrinal technique in constitu-
tional law.
III. Looking for Intrajurisdictional Coherence
The Supreme Court has already employed another judicial
technique in this context, albeit not consistently. In Solem
v. Helm, the Court outlined a three-step process in review-
ing punishments for excessiveness. First, courts should
compare "the gravity of the offense and the harshness of
the penalty," the gravity of the offense being determined
"in light of the harm caused or threatened to the victim or
society, and the culpability of the offender." Second, the
Court stated that "it may be helpful to compare the sen-
tences imposed on other criminals in the same
jurisdiction" and see whether "more serious crimes are
subject to the same penalty, or to less serious penalties."
Third, the Court suggested that "courts may find it useful
to compare the sentences imposed for commission of the
same crime in other jurisdictions." 22
This three-step test was substantially weakened in
Harmelin v. Michigan,23 and perhaps that is just as well.
The first step calls for the kind of "matching" of crime and
punishment that is, as discussed above, too indeterminate
to be of any use. The third step, "interjurisdictional com-
parisons," on the other hand, is difficult to square with
our federalist structure of government.2 4 However, the
second step, "intrajurisdictional comparisons," is worth
reinvigorating. Through the analysis, the Court can ask
how the punishment in question "fits" into the penal code
of a state and whether it stands in appropriate relation to
punishment for crimes that are as serious as or more seri-
ous than the crime for which the punishment is being
imposed within the same jurisdiction. Given the relative
ease with which we can list crimes in order of gravity and
punishments in order of harshness, the analysis need not
invite rudderless judicial activism.
Solem, which invalidated a sentence of life imprison-
ment without possibility of parole imposed on a recidivist
for passing a "no account" check in the amount of $ioo,
showed how such an analysis could be done. The Court
noted that in South Dakota, which did not have the death
penalty, Helm's sentence was "the most severe punish-
ment that the State could have imposed on any criminal
for any crime" even though his crime was far less serious
than other crimes that could be punished by life imprison-
ment in the state, such as "murder, treason, first degree
manslaughter, first degree arson, and kidnapping," and
some of the more serious crimes such as "a third offense
of heroin dealing or aggravated assault" could not be pun-
ished by life imprisonment at all. The Court concluded
that "[c]riminals committing any of these offenses ordinar-
ily would be thought more deserving of punishment" than
the defendant in the case.25
In Bajakajian, the Court similarly noted that the maxi-
mum fine under the statute defining the violation (as
opposed to the forfeiture statute) and the sentence under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were "but a fraction of
the penalties authorized" and concluded that they show
that "respondent's culpability relative to other potential
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violators of the reporting provision-tax evaders, drug
kingpins, or money launderers, for example-is small
indeed."26 Similar analyses could have easily exposed the
problems with the sentences in Harmelin and Ewing.27
IV. Forcing Deliberation
Legislators are constitutional actors with an independent
duty to observe and uphold the Constitution. One way for
the Court to protect Eighth Amendment values while
deferring to legislators' substantive decisions is to exam-
ine the legislative process to determine whether proper
deliberation has taken place, given the constitutional val-
ues at stake.
Justice O'Connor took this approach in her separate
opinion in Thompson v. Oklahoma, which held that those
who commit a crime at the age of fifteen or younger were
less culpable than adult criminals and were therefore not
deserving of death. 28 Even though Justice O'Connor dis-
agreed with the plurality's conclusion that "all
15-year-olds are incapable of the moral culpability that
would justify the imposition of capital punishment," she
voted to vacate the sentence because the State of Okla-
homa had not set a minimum age at which one could be
sentenced to death.
2 9
Justice O'Connor's message to state legislatures was to
take proportional limitations seriously in crafting rules of
punishment. Because of the widely accepted assumption
that juveniles were as a group less culpable, the state legis-
lature had to provide "the earmarks of careful
consideration" regarding the relative culpability of juve-
niles by deciding at what age the line should be drawn.30
Thus, Justice O'Connor framed the issue not as at what
age the Court itself would draw the line but as whether the
relevant legislature carefully considered the question of
where to draw the line.
By forcing the legislature to consider and even articu-
late why a particular punishment it is authorizing is not
disproportionate, the Court would encourage legislatures
to join an interbranch conversation about punishment and
force them to consider the issue of proportionality when-
ever they seek to deprive their citizens of life or liberty
through the criminal process.3' Forcing legislatures to con-
sider the constitutional values at stake in sentencing
through the legislative process could alleviate the usual
lack of representation of the criminal defendants' interests
in the democratic process.32
V. Conclusion
Even though the approaches discussed here are not
comprehensive and many line-drawing questions may
arise, this should not be a reason for the Court to
evade its responsibility to enforce the Eighth Amend-
ment, which appears to be the Court's current
position. The usual criticism that proportionality is an
unworkable ideal is overstated. The Court could utilize
familiar judicial techniques to protect Eighth Amend-
ment values.
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